Prof. Wang Di from CCBEF: The significant effect of uninformative signal on social preference

Title: The significant effect of uninformative signal on social preference

Speaker: Wang Di

Time: Nov 30, 2021 (Tuesday) 3:00am - 3:45pm

Address: Room 311 HongYuan Building


Abstract:

Information about the recipient affect people's giving behaviors. However little is known about how givers respond to uninformative signals, that is, signals that do not really tell us about the recipient's type. In our experiment, we use a mini-dictator game to generate such signals, in which the recipient allocates 0.5CNY either to herself or to another person. We then investigate how a third person, the giver, respond to such signals. Interestingly, We find that givers give significantly less to the recipient when she takes the 0.5 Yuan, but not give more when she gives it to the other person. This effect can be largely explained by changes in givers' belief about the recipient.



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