Title: The significant effect of trivial information about the recipient on dictator's giving behavior
Speaker: Wang Di
Date: Tuesday, 22nd June 2021
Time: 4:00pm – 5:30pm (Beijing time)
Location：Room 311 Hong Yuan Building
Abstract:
Naturally, information about the recipient affect people's giving behaviors. However little is known about how givers respond to trivial but interpretable information about the recipient. In this study we use the dictator game to investigate whether givers tend to be more selfish when such information is provided—the recipient's decision to allocate trivial amount of money with a third person. In general the answer is yes. Interestingly, we find that when dictators see that the recipient is trivially selfish, they tend to be significantly more selfish, whereas when they see that the recipient is trivially altruistic, they did not become less selfish to the recipient. We further explore possible explanations for this finding.
