主题：Manipulation and (mis)trust in prediction markets (with Todd R. Kaplan and Ro’i Zultan)

主讲人：Lawrence Choo

时间：2021年04月23日（星期五）下午2:00-3:30

地点：西南财经大学光华校区IFS会议室

主讲内容：

市场越来越多地被用作预测未来事件的信息聚合机制。如果政策制定者和管理者利用市场来指导政策和管理决策，相关各方可能会试图操纵市场以影响决策。我们通过实验研究了在操纵的阴影下，管理者根据市场信息进行决策的意愿。我们发现，当市场上有操纵者时，管理者对价格中透露的信息利用不足。此外，仅仅是对操纵的怀疑就会削弱对市场的信任，导致实施次优政策--即使没有实际的操纵。

Markets are increasingly used as information aggregation mechanisms to predict future events. If policy makers and managers use markets to guide policy and managerial decisions, interested parties may attempt to manipulate the market in order to influence decisions. We study experimentally the willingness of managers to base decisions on market information under the shadow of manipulation. We find that when there are manipulators in the market, managers under-utilize the information revealed in prices. Furthermore, mere suspicion of manipulation erodes trust in the market, leading to the implementation of suboptimal policies—even without actual manipulation.