主题：Can auctions select people by their level-k type?

主讲人：西南财经大学行为经济与行为金融研究中心，Lawrence Choo

时间：2021年11月2日（周二）下午3:00-4：30

地点：弘远楼3楼311室

内容提要:

在本文中，我们试图确定是否可以用拍卖来根据玩家的级别-k类型来选择玩家。为此，我们将拍卖嵌入到p-beauty contest游戏中。我们发现，通过使用不同的设计，我们可以让拍卖的赢家成为较低水平的K类型或较高水平的K类型。特别是，当赢得拍卖的价值在所有玩家的k级类型中是增加的时候，高k级玩家出价更高。当赢得拍卖的价值在所有玩家的k级类型中是递减的，低k级的玩家出价更高。综上所述，我们的实验证实了我们可以使用拍卖来按玩家的k级类型选择玩家。这表明，拍卖可以让经济设计者通过选择进入游戏的k级类型来影响游戏的结果。

In this paper, we seek to determine if auctions can be used to select players ac- cording to their level-k types. To do so, we embed auctions into the p-beauty contest game. We find that by using different designs, we can get the auction winners to be either the lower level-k types or the higher level-k types. In par- ticular, when the value of winning the auction is increasing in the level-k types of all the players, higher level-k players bid higher. When the value of winning the auction is decreasing in the level-k types of all the players, the lower level-k players bid higher. Taken together, our experiment confirms that we can use auc- tions to select players by their level-k types. This shows that auctions can allow an economic designer to affect the outcome of a game through the selection of level-k types entering to play the game.