时间：2024年12月10日，下午3：30-5：00

线下地点：弘远楼311室

Talk 1

主讲人：Shi Qichao

题目：Happy' to Yield: Strategic Information Disclosure in Asymmetric Chicken Games

摘要：

The "Happiness Concession" principle posits that in conflicts, parties with higher level of happiness should yield, as they face greater potential losses from continued conflict. We test this principle through a laboratory experiment using chicken games with asymmetric endowments, which represent participants' potential losses from competition. The experiment employs three information conditions: complete information, private information, and voluntary disclosure. Our results demonstrate that participants with higher endowments are more likely to yield, particularly in scenarios with complete information. However, when given the choice to disclose information, participants strategically underreport their endowments to increase their likelihood of successfully competing for the prize. These findings show that information asymmetry and strategic disclosure can significantly impact conflict resolution outcomes, and suggest a counterintuitive strategy: in competitive situations where one party must yield, displaying weakness rather than strength may prove more effective.

Talk 2

主讲人：He Qingrong

题目：Outside options and bargaining power in ultimatum games