题目：Competition-Driven Career Concerns, Multi-task Assignments and Heterogeneous Bureaucrats: Theory and Evidence
We construct a contest model to study bureaucrats’ incentives and strategic concerns in a system with internal promotion and empirically test its relevance. We include three features important in most bureaucracies: multi-task assignments, heterogeneous ability and age, and rent-seeking opportunities. Of the two tasks, the primary task can be quantitatively measured while the secondary task can only be qualitatively measured, which, together with the absence of revealed corruption, serve as necessary conditions for candidates to be qualified for promotion. The final winner is the qualified candidate with the best performance. We demonstrate how a candidate’s equilibrium incentive changes with her age and identify three strategic concerns caused by age and ability differences between candidates. In the empirical analysis, we construct effective proxies for senior bureaucrats’ perceived ability, effort allocation, and their corruption inclination, and show that Chinese prefecture data strongly support all theoretical predictions. This paper furthers our understanding of how institutions can profoundly shape bureaucrats’ incentives and behaviors, which influence policies.
徐晓书，现为上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授，研究领域为微观经济理论、产业组织、拍卖理论、机制设计、公共经济学和实验与行为经济学。她于2011年在俄亥俄州立大学取得经济学博士，此前，她分别于2006在俄亥俄州立大学取得经济学硕士学位和2005年在北京大学取得理学学士（数学与应用数学）和经济学学士（双学位）学位。她的论文主要发表在Games and Economic Behavior和International Journal of Game Theory等国际期刊。她曾为Review of Economic Studies、Theoretical Economics、Games and Economic Behavior、International Economic Review和Economic Theory等国际期刊担任过匿名审稿工作。