主题：Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences

主讲人：上海财经大学，Xiang Han

时间：2021年10月22日（周五）下午2:00

地点：弘远楼3楼311室

内容提要:

在56个发展中国家和发达国家，无偿献血志愿者的血液成分捐赠只能满足不到50%的需求。在这些国家，血库依靠替代献血者计划，为病人提供血液，以换取其亲属或朋友的献血。这些项目似乎是无序的、不透明的和低效的。我们将替代献血者计划和血液分配方案的设计作为市场设计的一个新应用。我们引入了最优的血液分配机制，这些机制考虑到了公平、效率和其他分配目标，以及在经典的一比一交换之外，接收和捐赠的血液单位之间的内源性交换率。此外，该机制还为病人提供了正确的激励，使其尽可能多地提供替代献血者。这个框架和机制类也适用于多单位交换不可分割的商品的一般应用，这些商品具有基于兼容性的偏好，超出了血液分配的不同信息问题。

In 56 developing and developed countries, blood component donations by volunteer non-remunerated donors can only meet less than 50% of the demand. In these countries, blood banks rely on replacement donor programs that provide blood to patients in return for donations made by their relatives or friends. These pro- grams appear to be disorganized, non-transparent, and inefficient. We introduce the design of replacement donor programs and blood allocation schemes as a new application of market design. We introduce optimal blood allocation mechanisms that accommodate fairness, efficiency, and other allocation objectives, together with endogenous exchange rates between received and donated blood units beyond the classical one-for-one exchange. Additionally, the mechanisms provide correct incentives for the patients to bring forward as many replacement donors as possible. This framework and the mechanism class also apply to general applications of multi-unit exchange of indivisible goods with compatibility-based preferences beyond blood allocation with different information problems.