主题：Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems

主讲人：Di Feng

        https://difeng.weebly.com/research.html

时间：2021年07月19日（星期一）下午2:00-3:30

地点：西南财经大学柳林校区弘远楼311室

主讲内容:

我们考虑了Moulin（1995）提出的多类型住房市场问题，并研究了严格的纳什均衡和严格核心（两个以不存在弱阻断联盟为定义的解概念）之间的关系。我们证明，对于lexicographically可分离的偏好，由严格核心稳定机制诱导的每个偏好启示博弈的所有严格的纳什均衡结果的集合是严格核心的一个子集，但反之则不是，即存在不能在严格的强纳什均衡中实施的严格核心分配（定理1）。这一结果被扩展到满足严格核心非豁免性和最小偏好域的丰富性假设的更一般的偏好域集合（定理2）。

    We consider multiple-type housing market problems as introduced by Moulin (1995) and study the relationship between strict strong Nash equilibria and the strict core (two solution concepts that are defined in terms of the absence of weak blocking coalitions). We prove that for lexicographically separable preferences, the set of all strict strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of each preference revelation game that is induced by a strictly core-stable mechanism is a subset of the strict core, but not vice versa, i.e., there are strict core allocations that cannot be implemented in strict strong Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1). This result is extended to a more general set of preference domains that satisfy strict core non-emptiness and a minimal preference domain richness assumption (Theorem 2).