主题：The significant effect of trivial information about the recipient on dictator's giving behavior

主讲人：王帝

时间：2021年06月22日（星期二）下午4:00-5:30

地点：西南财经大学柳林校区弘远楼311室

主讲内容：

自然地，关于接受者的信息会影响人们的捐赠行为。 然而，人们对捐赠者如何回应关于接受者的微不足道但可解释的信息知之甚少。 在这项研究中，我们使用了独裁者游戏来研究当这种信息被提供时，捐赠者是否倾向于更加自私--接收者决定与第三个人分配微不足道的钱。一般来说，答案是肯定的。有趣的是，我们发现，当独裁者看到接受者是微不足道的自私时，他们往往会明显地更加自私，而当他们看到接受者是微不足道的利他主义时，他们对接受者的自私并没有减少。我们进一步探讨这一发现的可能解释。

Naturally, information about the recipient affect people's giving behaviors. However little is known about how givers respond to trivial but interpretable information about the recipient. In this study we use the dictator game to investigate whether givers tend to be more selfish when such information is provided—the recipient's decision to allocate trivial amount of money with a third person. In general the answer is yes. Interestingly, we find that when dictators see that the recipient is trivially selfish, they tend to be significantly more selfish, whereas when they see that the recipient is trivially altruistic, they did not become less selfish to the recipient. We further explore possible explanations for this finding.