主题:Can market selection reduce anomalous behaviour in games?
主讲人:Lawrence Choo
时间:2021年04月20日(星期二)晚上21:30-23:00
地点:西南财经大学柳林校区弘远楼311会议室
主办单位:中国行为经济与行为金融研究中心
主讲内容:
我们用一个实验来研究市场选择是否能减少游戏中的异常行为。在不同的处理中,我们采用了两种替代机制,即随机机制和拍卖机制,来分配红帽子谜题游戏的参与权,这是一个著名的逻辑推理问题。与随机机制相比,拍卖机制大大减少了红帽子谜题游戏中对均衡游戏的偏离。我们的发现表明,在精心设计的激励机制下,市场竞争确实可以减少游戏中的异常行为。
We use an experiment to study whether market selection can reduce anomalous behaviour in games. In different treatments, we employ two alternative mechanisms, the random mechanism and the auction mechanism, to allocate the participation rights to the red hat puzzle game, a well-known logical reasoning problem. Compared to the random mechanism, the auction mechanism significantly reduces deviations from the equilibrium play in the red hat puzzle game. Our findings show that under carefully designed incentives, market competition can indeed reduce anomalous behaviour in games.